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Conceptualising broligarchy: technofeudalism, networked misogyny, and genres of Man

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Abstract

This article develops the concept of broligarchy as a historically specific gendered formation anchored in technofeudal production mechanisms: a small tech super-elite combining extraordinary wealth with infrastructural and communicative control. Drawing on Sylvia Wynter and Achille Mbembe, I read the broligarchic subject as a possible Man₃: a hybrid technobiological figure grounded in myths of super-intelligence, transhumanist futurity and elite transcendence. The imaginary of Man₃ recodes and combines colonial and feudal logic, allowing consent to be manufactured partly through the offer of networked misogyny as a compensatory form of power to lesser men. The platform emerges as the site of a necropolitical war amongst the dysselected that supports technofeudal data extraction, suppresses resistance, and consolidates broligarchic dominance at the expense of the empirical human world.

Keywords

Broligarchy, Sylvia Wynter, manosphere, necropolitics, sexual violence, technofeudalism

Introduction: defining broligarchy

The term 'broligarchy', while rapidly entering public consciousness and media debates, is undertheorized academically. In demographic terms, all oligarchies could be considered broligarchies: but 'broligarchy' is vernacularly used to refer to a particular male platform elite (de Boise 2025; Smith-Carrier et al, 2025; McGonagle 2026). Ownership of the platform, the structure that hosts, organizes and constitutes (too-)late capitalist markets, is what differentiates the contemporary broligarchy from previous oligarchies that enjoyed high levels of influence and economic success. Given that platforms also increasingly monopolize the organisation of knowledge, communication, and (anti-)social relations (Yan 2026: 215), 'broligarchy' could be understood to denote a fusion of economic wealth, infrastructural control, and cultural reach that has not been observed before.

Tech billionaires are amongst the wealthiest men in history in absolute terms, and the dominant group in the contemporary global oligarchy or plutocracy that also includes financiers, media CEOs, real estate moguls, and carbon capitalists (Dean 2020: 6). Major tech companies are amongst the most valuable of all time, and CEOs/founders such as Mark Zuckerberg, Larry Page and Sergey Brin also wield majority voting power within

them (McGonagle 2026). Little and Winch (2021: 6, 14, 39) term tech billionaires an assemblage involved in a 'full-spectrum struggle for social and political leadership'. This struggle is articulated through super-predatory economic practices, cultural discourse, and the social relations of firms (Dean 2022a; Little and Winch 2021: 8, 10-11; Varoufakis 2023: 86).

The broligarchy wields significant political, legal and extra-legal power both intra- and internationally (Dean 2022b: 13). This may be deployed to escape regulation and tax, gain access to cheap energy or raw materials, and convince states to cut welfare budgets or sell off public assets for stripping. These strategies siphon wealth from the populace, wealth which is generally not reinvested but hoarded in 'trophy assets' or offshore accounts (Little and Winch 2021: 91-2). Populations foot the bill through austerity, producing the fathomless and widening gulf between rich and poor that is no longer restricted to the Global South but pertains on a planetary scale (Dean 2020: 6-7, 11, 13). Platformization is serviced by extractivist economies that produce militarised enclaves and morbid zones of exception in the Global South (Mbembe 2003: 33-4). Worldwide, it organises an underclass of service and gig workers subject to new modalities of dispossession (Dean 2020).

This apex of contemporary (too-)late capitalism, what Mbembe (2020) calls brutalism, has been conceptualized by some as constitutive of a post-capitalist, neofeudal mode of production. Contemporary dynamics of hoarding and wasting are seen as constitutive of relations that connote feudal lords and serfs more than capitalists and the proletariat. For Jodi Dean (2022a: 53), to say that contemporary capitalism is 'tending' to neofeudalism does not mean there are no longer capitalistic exploitative relations. Instead, it means that other dimensions of production - expropriation, domination and force - have intensified significantly. Expropriation occurs through workforce precarity, mounting debt, utility price hikes, increased private rents and evictions, and the mining and sale of personal data (Dean 2020: 6).

Mechanisms of production, sites of sovereignty

The expropriation of personal data via the platform is what produces tech corporations that can be more valuable than national economies, understood as a (re-)parcellisation of sovereignty (Dean 2022a: 7, 45) in which governments relate to these entities as if they were sovereign states. Racial capitalism has always incorporated dispersed sites of economic sovereignty, from the corporate drivers of colonialism, to the 'robber barons' of the Gilded Age, to the banking and media dynasties that ushered in the 20th century. The sovereignty of Big Tech is monetarily and militarily different to that of entities such as the Dutch and British East India Companies; their infrastructural control is also less terrestrial and more vertical via the Stack (see Bratton 2015; cf Mbembe 2003: 28). However, the communicative dominion granted by the latter is perhaps unequalled.

Furthermore, as Achille Mbembe (2019: 123) puts it, platform capitalism does not merely extract surplus value through attention but has a deeper project of 'formatting as many minds as possible'. 20th century mass media monopolies have been dislodged by mushrooming platforms that seek to monopolize consumption, desire, self-expression, knowledge and public debate on a global scale (McGonagle 2026: 2; Yan 2026: 210). As Mbembe (2019: 123) writes, this promises to reshape the Symbolic Order and colonize the unconscious, which can be seen as a form of microfascism with potentially devastating effects. The colonization of inner space goes hand-in-hand with the material platformization of everyday life, which can be seen as increasingly necropolitical in its potential to shut down life-support systems such as supply logistics, payment authentication, identity verification, and security procedures (cf Mbembe 2003: 31).

The dominance of cloud kingdoms in the neofeudal conjuncture is what Yanis Varoufakis (2023: 5-6) terms technofeudalism. The growing centrality of the platform to both production and consumption (and the merger between the two) repositions even the owners of traditional capital as vassals to overlords who own the digital land. The technofeudal mode of production also creates 'cloud proles' and 'techno serfs': the former include Amazon pickers, Meta developers, and outsourced content moderators in the Global South, while *all users* of cloud platforms are rendered 'peasant' through the extraction and sale of data (Varoufakis 2023: 76). This constitutes new forms of dependency: as Dean (2022b: 12) puts it, the personal dependencies of historical

feudalism have returned as ‘abstract, algorithmic dependence on the platforms that mediate our lives’. While we own the means of production (our devices), we need the platform for consumption (of which it takes a cut) and production (of which it takes a cut). We also labour for the platform unpaid under the guise of participation, producing and interacting with the content that allows cloud capital to reproduce (Dean 2022a: 47; Varoufakis 2023).

What Varoufakis (2023: 81, 220) calls ‘cloudalist power’ has ambitions to be total in its organisation, surveillance, prediction, and shaping of human behaviour. These ambitions are contained in the algorithms that, in being trained by us, train us in return. As Varoufakis (2023: 70) puts it, ‘Big Tech knows us better than anyone should’, and this power to guide behaviour towards maximal accumulation is used to sell access to our identities to brokers and advertisers, and to restrict our own access to ourselves. Such power is inherently anti-democratic: tech kingdoms are not built from the sale of commodities but from lines of influence and control that reach into almost every household. This is the architecture in which wealth accumulates independently and resplendently, via cloud rent and data extraction. Like traditional kingdoms, tech sovereignty has to a large extent been bestowed, from the initial funding of the Internet through taxpayer dollars to the cash injection of quantitative easing (Varoufakis 2023; Yan 2026). It has also been conferred on men who see themselves as born to rule, albeit not by royal blood but by virtue of their supernatural-computational brains (Phipps 2026: 193).

There are many critiques of the technofeudal thesis, which argue that it underplays the feudal elements *within* racial capitalism and its chameleon-like potential for crisis response (see e.g. Saito & Sasaki 2026; Yan 2026). Here, it is useful to turn to Aníbal Quijano (2000: 220), who reminds us racial capitalism is both patchy and contradictory, ‘a structure of heterogeneous elements with inconsistent, discontinuous, even conflictive relations’. We do not need to agree that technofeudalism has replaced capitalism to see the utility of this terminology for describing an emergent set of production or primitive accumulation mechanisms operating through the generation and harvesting of data (see Yan 2026). The framework of technofeudalism can also be used to anchor the concept of brologarchy in productive and useful ways. There have certainly been shifts in the mode of production that, in Varoufakis’ (2023: 56) words, enable power to be concentrated ‘in the hands of even fewer individuals’ (see also Mbembe 2019: 122). The concept of brologarchy furthers our comprehension of this emergent dominant bloc, which in symbolic and ideological as well as economic terms, may challenge established understandings of the capitalist class.

Shifting genres of Man

This new super-elite, like the others before it, is almost entirely male. Unlike the language of technofeudalism, the concept of brologarchy names a power formation that is explicitly gendered. It also names a mode of power that is not identical to patriarchy: if patriarchy refers to a generalized form of masculine rule, brologarchy denotes a particular and historically contingent sub-form, a matrix of cooperation between specific influential men (cf de Boise 2025). This matrix can be understood as deeply embedded in technofeudal mechanisms of production, which accumulate power with a small group of men at the expense of ‘everyday’ patriarchs. As Ben Little and Alison Winch (2021: 139) put it, even the head of the household must submit to the platform. Reflecting this, tech ‘geniuses’ have been exalted in contemporary culture, supported by marketing and media coverage dependent on their own personal myth-making (Little and Winch 2021: 2).

The idea of brologarchy also implies a self-consciously gendered style of rule, an amended manifestation of hegemonic masculinity that Little and Winch (2021: i) term ‘digital capitalism’s mode of command’. Building on Sylvia Wynter (2003; & McKittrick 2015), we might understand the tech ‘genius’ as the early emergence of a new *genus*, or a nascent Man₃. If such a category exists, it would be descendant of the rational, pious Man₁ (the Renaissance *homo politicus*) that triggered the development of the physical sciences, and the secular, bioeconomic Man₂ (the 19th century *homo oeconomicus*) that catalysed the development of the biological and evolutionary sciences. If we can spot a 21st century Man₃, technological sciences may underpin this new genus. Wynter (& McKittrick 2015: 43) argues that anti-colonial movement-building, climate shock and the invention of

nuclear weapons all have the potential to shake the descriptive statement of the human: it is arguable that the development of artificial intelligence could/should be added to this list.

The sociogenic principle denotes that 'Man' is not just an idea but a world-making narrative, not just a powerful group of people but a normative template of the human. Wynter's first two genres of Man represent the post-Mediaeval shift away from Christian iconography and narratives of sin and damnation, initially into a new human/subhuman binary based on degrees of assumed rationality. The production of Man₁ as a humanistic subject (*I think, therefore I am*) then gave way to the emergence of Man₂ as a bioeconomic subject (*my genome = myself*), both constructed on the basis of the colonizer/colonized relation. Reason, Wynter (2003: 263-4, 287, 296, 310) writes, was initially assigned partial divinity in its capacity to demarcate 'natural masters' and 'natural slaves'; this was followed by the principles of natural selection and dysselection which functioned as a 'de facto new Argument from Design'.

Contemporary tech mythology repackages both rationality and biology into a technobiological obsession with ('natural' and artificial) intelligence and computational life (cf Mbembe 2019: 106). Liang Wang and Bernadette Baker (2024: 44, 51, 55-7) argue that the 'brain-as-computer' metaphor marks the 21st century as reason marked the Enlightenment (see also Mbembe 2020: 14; Thomas 2024: 16). Tech 'genius' mythology is deeply inflected by ideas of optimisation and performance, since extraordinary meritocracy is required to authorize extraordinary wealth; the *mythos* here is of a super-intelligence we 'humans of lesser value' (Swisher 2024: 200) cannot hope to understand. As tech elites gaze into futurity, the myth of super-elite super-intelligence further mingles with the fantasy of an artificial super-intelligence (ASI) that will eventually supersede human intelligence ('the Singularity') and populate the stars (Thomas 2024: 9, 15).

In the future according to the broligarchy, the Cartesian mind will be supplanted by a mind/machine hybrid, and in a context of impending climate collapse the empirical human world (cf Wynter 2003: 262) is not saved but sacrificed for an extraplanetary migration reserved for the elite. ASI-driven, spacefaring societies are the phoenix that rises from the ashes after the extinction of most of the human race (Burke 2026). This is a pro-extinctionist order-of-business (Torres 2025) in which the superior few will also be able to meld their DNA with technology through transhumanist adaptations (Giri 2025; Thomas 2024: 3-4, 20-1; Wang and Baker 2024). For Mbembe (2020: 14), this 'becoming-human of objects and machines' could well constitute the real 'great replacement'.

Transhumanism has roots in Enlightenment principles of reason, conquest of nature through technology, and teleological human progress (Hughes 2012; Thomas 2024: 6-9). However, the shift from Darwinian biological hierarchy into transhumanist bio-technical hybridity shifts from mastery over nature to escape from nature, from humanism to an exit from the human condition. This is a complex mix that both emphasizes the liberal individual and his capacity for technologically-mediated self-improvement, and destabilizes this individual through hybridisation and networked intelligence (Mbembe 2019: 66; Thomas 2024: 24-5). However, although Mbembe (2019: 46, 97) argues that this fragmentation of humanity might eventually negate the species, the master plan appears to be that a select few will survive.

This select few may well eventually leave biology behind and upload their minds to the cloud (Mbembe 2019: 24; Thomas 2024: 13). In the future according to digital eugenics, humanity is what Elon Musk has called a 'biological bootloader for digital superintelligence' and ASI becomes a successor intelligence once the mass of humanity has died out (Thomas 2024: 2; Torres 2025; Torres & Henwood 2025). This exclusionary descriptive statement arguably goes a step further than the ethnoclass mastercode of previous genres of Man (see Wynter 2003: 315), in its imaginary of a small cognitive caste able to transcend the human condition. Digital eugenics also sits alongside support of human enhancement through pronatalism, and a concern with 'dysgenics' or the wrong kind of reproduction (read: the reproduction of the 'wrong' people) (Torres and Henwood 2025). Big Tech is linked to a range of fertility start-ups and genetic prediction services, many of which have expanded disease avoidance into polygenic scoring (Dwoskin and Torbati 2025).¹

¹ Polygenic scoring (or a polygenic risk score) is a controversial method with limited predictive accuracy, which estimates an individual's genetic predisposition to a trait or outcome by combining the small effects of variants across the genome.

The longtermist project of digital eugenics is also melded with right-wing accelerationism intended to legitimate resource-heavy and unregulated investments in both AI and space technologies (Kessler 2024; Taskale 2026). A cruel mathematics (Alagraa 2021) drives misanthropic and climate-hostile projects designed to safeguard the (potentially off-planet or wholly digital) future of the cognitive elite at the expense of the masses. This could be seen as an extension of what Bedour Alagraa (2021) calls the 'interminable catastrophe', in which Darwinian and Malthusian discourses positioned calamities as planetary 'self-corrections' that targeted the 'unvirtuous'. Such techno-necropolitics appears to constitute a deliberate acceleration of catastrophe to preserve the future for the chosen few.

Tech billionaires' material and ideological investments in AI, transhumanism, and reproductive design represent not merely the ultimate form of power (Mbembe 2019: 23) but interventions into progress, futurity, and the definition of the human. The biopolitical functions of the platform in collecting and processing personal data combine with a necropolitical organisation of selection/dysselection (see Wynter 2003) and determined violation of limits and taboos (cf Mbembe 2003: 14, 16). It seems that the category of the dysselected, previously reserved for the racialized and especially the Black peoples of the world (Wynter & McKittrick, 2025: 10), is expanding in the context of elite obsessions with super-intelligence and superior humanity. This speaks to the essence of what Mbembe (2020: 10, 15) calls brutalism, in which the living become merely 'a layer and a surface' and dehumanization is standard, producing a 'universalization of the black condition, the becoming-black of a very large swathe of humanity.' In other words, the brologarchic conjuncture may signal a shift away from white Europe as the locus of legible humanity towards a smaller master class of men.

Man3 and technological divinity

Wynter's (2003: 318) genres of man are not mutually exclusive: Man₁, Man₂ and any germinal Man₃ should be read as always interwoven (Phipps 2026: 194). Illustrating this, Little and Winch (2021: 14) find tech's alpha masculinity strongly resonant of the bourgeois white patriarchy of the 19th century colonial US. Their account places figures such as Musk, Bezos, Zuckerberg and Thiel alongside 'robber barons' such as Guggenheim, Rockefeller, Carnegie, Vanderbilt, and Stanford. Bezos, they write, is seen as a 'visionary and pioneer', who ties his sovereignty at Amazon to a frontier spirit celebrating the firm's harsh 'cybernetic Taylorism'. Many of Musk's advocates similarly frame his work in terms of digital frontiersmanship (Little and Winch 2021: 67, 96, 102). Such digital pioneers might also be conceptualized as the acme of *homo economicus*, shifting accumulation and free-market capitalism into super-accumulation and predatory monopoly capitalism as the locus of subjectivity (cf Wynter & McKittrick 2015: 10 19).

As I have argued already, this predatory economic modus could also be seen as technofeudal in its drive for total market domination (cf Varoufakis 2023; see also Yan 2026: 216). Indeed, the technofeudal thesis quietly asks whether the master discipline of liberal economics that underpins previous genres of Man is undergoing a shift. Closer examination of the tech sector's hegemonic masculinity similarly suggests additional, and more archaic, genres at work. It is difficult to imagine Carnegie and Rockefeller challenging each other to a cage fight, as Musk and Zuckerberg did in 2023. The masculinities that organise the tech sector are both virile and infantile: fraternal rather than paternal, echoing other toxic and juvenile iterations such as those expressed in Gamergate (Braithwaite 2016) and 'lad cultures' (Phipps and Young 2015) yet with a strongly authoritarian bent. Musk performs 'superstar virility' (Little and Winch 2021: 62), with fourteen current acknowledged children and exploits such as smoking marijuana while wielding a samurai sword on Joe Rogan's podcast. Zuckerberg has been described as a 'muscle MMA fighting, patriotic foil boarding, bison-killing, performative-tractorriding-calf-feeding' avatar of himself (Swisher 2024: 127-8).

Kara Swisher's (2024: 129-30) account of the tech industry, based on decades of reportage and relationships with its key figures, implicitly positions tech billionaires less as colonial patriarchs and more as feudal kings (indeed, she uses the epithet 'boy kings' to describe them). She writes that Zuckerberg's absolute rule at Facebook could even be likened to that of a Roman Emperor, with the platform's power to spread misinformation

supporting tyrannical levels of social havoc (including Brexit, the election of Donald Trump and the Rohingya genocide) (Swisher 2024: 132). She notes his idolisation of Augustus Caesar, who established the Pax Romana at the price of ‘subjugation, colonization, and so, so much death’: like this analogue, Swisher (2024: 134) argues, Zuckerberg’s dream ‘is to connect the world, no matter the cost’.

Tech sector worldviews could be read as suffused with feudal imaginaries, a hodgepodge of IQ realism and technoscience plus neo-archaic fantasies, conspiracies, and myths. While previous elites have allied themselves with humanist scholars, the TESCREAL ideological cluster² (Torres 2025) intellectually aligns contemporary brologarchs with more offbeat groups (for instance, UFO subcultures, alchemists, and ascensionists) in their quest to master the future. Blake Smith (2026) highlights the prominence of Tolkien and similar authors in the tech canon, citing a preference for texts that blend fantasy, imminent apocalypse, and ambitious projects of world-building. These projects, he writes, can range from ‘unobjectionable (eliminating diseases) to desirable but perhaps currently unfeasible (colonizing Mars), to confusing (holding back the advent of the Antichrist)’ – the latter in the case of Peter Thiel.

The fantasia Smith observes exemplifies the general ‘return to animism’ Mbembe (2019: 61, 65, 66; 2020: 16, 30-1, 40-1) observes in the contemporary conjuncture. Algorithmic reason, he argues, has emerged hand-in-hand with the re-emergence of mytho-religiosity and in the context of the commodified ‘cult of the self’ that has reached its peak in the self-portrait-preoccupied digital realm. The transhumanist project in particular is set within a quasi-religious frame with strong links to apocalyptic Christianity and millennialism as well as cryonics (Hughes 2012; Mbembe 2019: 24; Thomas 2024: 4, 14). This apocalyptic bent does important work: it links grassroots disaster-prepping with elite bids for power through exploiting paranoia and ‘modulating the thresholds of catastrophe’ (Mbembe 2019: 37, 114, 118). The establishment of a state of exception is especially conspicuous in the fact that the creators of artificial intelligence have now become some of the loudest soothsayers of its role in our imminent doom.

Overall, the miscellaneous list of *dramatis personae* wrapped up in the figure of the brologarch - including the pioneer, the robber baron, the lothario, the samurai, the huntsman, and the emperor - suggests that in any potential computational genre of Man₃, more archaic forms of manhood may also be reiterated and renewed. Brologarchic sovereignty, which is both biopolitical and increasingly necropolitical, also has the potential to approach an almighty level of command (cf Varoufakis 2023: 61). Musk, as Swisher (2024: 10, 49) writes, has long considered himself ‘more than just a man, but an icon and, on some days, a god.’ This brings to mind a potential reformulation of the Mediaeval doctrine of divine right, rooted in contemporary technobiological creeds.

Homo technofeudalis and networked misogyny

‘Bro’ denotes a type of masculinity that is both fraternal and openly hostile to women (de Boise 2025, p180), which is also contiguous with Gamergate and the ‘lad cultures’ of the 1990s and onwards. The shift from ‘bro’, into ‘brologarchy’ may also produce and require amended articulations of gendered violence. I have argued that Man₃, if such a category exists, represents less an ethnoclass than a select cabal of dominant men with ambitions for universal exploitation (cf Varoufakis 2023: 218; Mbembe 2020). This ‘move fast and break things’ pro-extinctionist genre manifests in uncontained marauding and predation that reflect relations of dominance and subordination between men and attempt to establish absolute dominion over women.

Tech billionaires preside over working environments saturated with sexual harassment and abuse. In 2018, after a Google staff walkout over the issue, a *Guardian* investigation found that members of Alphabet’s board ‘were [its] knowing and direct enablers’ (Wong 2019). In 2021, Jeff Bezos’ space company Blue Origin was described as ‘rife with sexism’ in an open letter by current and ex-staffers, which also claimed that ‘numerous senior leaders [had] been known to be consistently inappropriate with women’ (Milmo 2021). There have been

² TESCREAL is defined by Torres (2025) and others as comprised of transhumanism, extropianism (the pursuit of indefinite life extension), singularitarianism (the view that ASI will transform civilization), cosmism, rationalist community, effective altruism, altruism and longtermism.

stories of widespread sexual harassment in Amazon warehouses and similar accounts at Uber, linked to the attitudes and behaviours of co-founder and previous CEO Travis Kalanick (Swisher 2024: 139-140).

In 2022, sexual harassment cases were brought by seven women working at Tesla. In *Rolling Stone*, Stephen Rodrick (2022) noted that the alleged level of abuse situated the company 'as more like one of William Blake's dark "Satanic Mills" than a high-flying Silicon Valley corporation.' One complainant recounted hearing a male colleague boast about spitting in a woman's face during sex. Such remarks cannot be separated from Elon Musk's sexually charged public persona (denounced as 'fratish' in an open letter by SpaceX employees), and his state-of-the-art divinity. As another Tesla complainant said: 'there are people in that factory who see Elon Musk as a god. 'If he talks like that, they know they can, too.'

The gods of cloud capital also preside over networked lifeworlds where such talk (and worse) is normalized or encouraged under the guise of 'freedom of speech'. A significant amount of this digital violence emanates from the manosphere, a motley yet hierarchically organised assemblage including anti-feminists, men's rights activists, evangelical Christians, paleomasculinists, incels, 'pick-up artists', and Men Going Their Own Way. This entity pulsates with sexual comments, threats, explicit and private content, and new formations of violence such as revenge and deepfake porn (Banet-Weiser 2018: 64, 84; Phipps 2026: 200). Such acts can also commute from online to off, notoriously in the case of incels who have committed acts of mass murder (Bratich and Banet-Weiser 2019: 5005, 5016; Phipps 2026: 202).

The manosphere is a complex and hybrid space that could be seen as both neoliberal and technofeudal. Digital misogyny is often conceptualised as a backlash against feminism, a means of rendering networked lifeworlds untenable for women and thereby preventing them from accessing and controlling the means of technocapitalist production (Siapera 2019; see also Banet-Weiser 2018; Dey 2023). There are neoliberal tropes in evidence around 'manfluencers' (clip-farming opportunists and entrepreneurs) and figures such as pick-up artists (whose jargon combines the gender essentialism of evolutionary psychology with economic rationalities such as investment, returns, and market value (Ging 2019: 90)). Through a technofeudal lens, however, the manosphere appears less an exclusionary space and more a yawning abyss that swallows all and sundry for the purposes of value extraction.

The manosphere is a perfect example of the online outrage economy (Phipps 2020: 84) mapped to the technofeudal project of data mining that has made the brologarchy the richest men in the world. Violence in the manosphere tends to be enacted via the same clutch of manoeuvres (trolling, mobbing, 'edgelording') that build engagement through both complicity and outrage. The requirement for a constant supply of accomplices, victims and enraged bystanders is consistent with the technofeudal mechanisms of production that require us all to spend as much time online as possible, as often as possible, for maximum harvesting of data. Platform rules are therefore inconsistently enforced by content moderation, and completely annulled by the fact that violence is key to the business model of what Swisher (2024: 168) calls anti-social media.

We can also observe that the neoliberal, entrepreneurial figure most often associated with the manosphere (profiled to Man₂ or *homo oeconomicus*) appears increasingly overlaid or interwoven with a more explicitly feudal subject, or *homo technofeudalis*, as Varoufakis (2023: 161) might put it. Manfluencers combine market ideologies and hyper-modern pursuits - such as bodybuilding, doping and looksmaxxing - with warlike, monarchical, hierarchical and autocratic discourse that climaxes in Andrew Tate's supremacist fantasy of taking women as slaves (Phipps 2026: 203). One of Tate's close associates is self-proclaimed 'wizard' Iggy Semmelweiss, who has said: 'this is the life that all men should dream of, the life of a Cimmerian conqueror' (Dickson 2023). Feudal imaginaries are also visible in now digitized, but centuries-old, regulatory practice of woman-shaming: this has been theorized as the flip side of the neoliberal cult of self-esteem (Banet-Weiser 2018: 67-70), but there is also a Mediaeval spectacle when it is enacted in the networked public square. Whether we understand the underlying mode of production as technofeudalism or neoliberal/platform capitalism, it seems that the manosphere is home to mingling genres of Man.

Dysselection and data extraction: the technofeudal covenant

Digital violence also reflects the power relations between men suggested by the concept of brologarchy. Networked cultural influence will always be subsidiary to ownership of the digital land; the symbolic fiefdoms of Andrew Tate and others appear modest next to tech billionaires' material and communicative control. Indeed, we might ask whether the relation between manfluencers and tech billionaires constitutes a splintering occupation of the cloud (cf Mbembe 2003: 28), with cloud bubbles mere prefectures in vertical space. In these domains, manfluencers' wares are sold to aggrieved and downwardly mobile men, many of whom describe feelings of social isolation, economic uncertainty, and failure. These reflect both relative deprivation and loss of entitlement, and the brutalist inequality and deterioration in life-making (Mbembe 2020) that has been defined as neo- or technofeudal. With this in mind, manfluencing seems less about selling success and more about generating 'cheat codes' to small gains in supremacy over women. While some men can afford these (both literally and figuratively), others cannot get in on the deal.

In the current conjuncture, increasing populations - including those previously secure in the Global North - are rendered surplus to racial capitalist requirements due to over-accumulation and awareness of environmental limits (Bhattacharyya 2018). This surplus is understood in terms of 'natural scarcity' and techno-eugenics rather than predatory economics and elite power (Wynter & McKittrick 2015: 26, 37) This represents a potential enlargement of the (always elastic) ideological category of the dysselected: a repopulation in which more of the empirical human world is relegated to the status of 'lesser value' (cf Mbembe 2019: 20-1; Swisher 2024: 200; Wynter 2003: 262). The project of universal exploitation that marks the brologarchy (cf Varoufakis 2024: 218), which reserves futurity for a chosen few at the expense of the masses, requires near-universal dehumanization (Mbembe 2020: 10, 15).

However, any shift from ethnoclass to cabal in humanity's dominant descriptive statement will also require that the dysselected continue to be stratified according to factors such as race, class, and geography. The data-colonial ungending in which we are all reduced to zeroes and ones (Phipps 2026: 8, 212) does not infer equivalence between those subject to networked misogyny and those sleeping below the Mediterranean waters and beneath the Gazan rubble. If we are all increasingly rendered excess in relation to the emergent techno-cabal, such receding of mass futurity will require intensified and amended strategies of divide and rule. This is pertinent to the border, the checkpoint, the detention centre, the prison and other neocolonial projects of separation (see Mbembe 2019: 53); it also sheds light on the war of all-against-all in digital fiefs.

Eugenia Siapera (2019) theorizes online misogyny as a strategy of re-enclosure similar to the Early Modern witch hunts, which shut women into bourgeois femininity and nuclearity to create racial capitalism's socially reproductive labor force (Federici 2004). There are certainly strong continuities between manosphere swarms and offline far-right and paleoconservative projects to restore patriarchal gender. The technofeudal arrangement, however, appears substantially different from the previous patriarchal bargain between capital and labor (Phipps 2026: 213). In the Early Modern covenant, proletarian men were offered power over women - private patriarchy - to manufacture their consent. The main institution of this power was the bourgeois family, with the 'family wage' as the material means of controlling women and children. The technofeudal covenant does not appear to offer any such material compensation. What tech billionaires offer instead is the right to abuse with impunity ('free speech'), which feeds the algorithm, which increases the value of the digital real estate.

In other words, the reading of the manosphere as engaged in a project of wholesale patriarchal restoration sits uneasily with the possibility that patriarchy has become brologarchy. Instead, it appears more apposite to Mbembe's (2019: 125) prediction that under neoliberal conditions, 'politics will become a barely sublimated warfare' in which 'destroyed subjects', presumably of all genders, attempt to grapple with feelings of existential threat. One of the sites of such warfare is clearly the platform, which Mbembe (2019: 125; 2020: 41-2) positions as a new infrastructure...of the unconscious', in which the human psyche enjoys free rein in the context of the shift from knowledge into data (and accompanying abrogation of truth, accountability and morality), and the incessant solipsistic reflections that constitute existence in the digital world.

Mbembe's point about neoliberalism can be usefully extended through both brutalism and neofeudalism, which normalize and naturalize the 'planet of slums' (cf Wynter & McKittrick 2015: 11) in which destroyed subjects increasingly reside. An additional layer is provided by the technofeudal thesis, which describes the close relationships between data extraction and networked violence. We can therefore work towards a multifaceted account, situated within a neofeudal context that puts tenable social futures increasingly out of reach, neoliberal value systems of individual responsabilization, and the technofeudal mechanism with its business model of engagement and outrage. Violence, often enacted by 'virtual hordes' that become their own theater and spectacle (Mbembe 2019: 66, 124), can then be seen as a mode of psychic catharsis that attempts to demarcate subjects and non-subjects while also manufacturing consent and extracting cloud-based value.

Tech billionaires' inordinate communicative capital tends to be spent furthering the interests of the far-right leaders and parties who would ensure the continuation of these conditions and worse: unfettered accumulation and crushing inequality accompanied by unregulated 'free speech' both on- and offline (McGonagle 2026, p1). Technological populism (Stănescu 2026) dovetails with contemporary authoritarian populism in a formation that increasingly appears technofascist, especially given the role of platforms in mediating knowledge production and the construction and distribution of truth (cf Eco 2020: 19). Attacks on DEI and what Elon Musk calls the 'woke mind virus' go beyond Silicon Valley machismo and opposition to 'political correctness' (Lewis 2025), evoking a 'society of enmity' (cf Mbembe 2019) model that might defend the dominant cabal and its interests by shifting into necropolitical gear.

The bifurcation of any potential Man_3 - a combination of technobiology, economic super-supremacy and feudal imaginary - seems crucial to the contemporary apparatus that both serves data extraction and manufactures consent. While super-intelligence and technological transcendence may appear out of reach, downwardly mobile men can nevertheless emulate the feudal symbolic through violent catharsis in the cloud. The manosphere can therefore be seen as an important site at which the category of the human is being rearticulated, but not in the interests of those who perpetrate digital violence. Instead, the dominant cabal - representing the potential emergent Man_3 - hoard humanity, futurity, and wealth for themselves and their descendants while the rest of us fight.

Conclusion

This article has developed the concept of brologarchy as a historically specific gendered formation. This formation is anchored in technofeudal mechanisms of production in which a small tech super-elite combines extraordinary wealth with infrastructural and communicative control. Drawing on Wynter (2003; & McKittrick 2015) and Achille Mbembe (2003; 2019), I have read the brologarchic subject as a possible Man_3 , a hybrid technobiological and necropolitical figure grounded in myths of super-intelligence, transhumanist futurity and elite transcendence. Wynter (2003: 260, 262) identifies 'the struggle of our times' as being against the overrepresentation of the Western ethnoclass that situates itself as 'the human itself', to the detriment of the 'empirical human world'. Man_3 , if such a creature exists, has migrated from ethnoclass to cabal, from the Iberian peninsula, heavy industry and the gold rush to Próspera³, cloud capital, and crypto.

The imaginary of Man_3 recodes and combines colonial and feudal logic, which plays a key role in manufacturing consent to brologarchic power. This is at least partially done through sexual violence, often articulated through feudal imaginaries and enacted on unregulated platforms by 'lesser' men as a compensatory form of power. My analysis has brought the platform into view as the site of a necropolitical war of all-against-all that both supports technofeudal data extraction and suppresses resistance. This becomes exigent in a context in which tenable social futures are receding and increasing populations are being rendered surplus: the category of the dysselected may be expanding to include the mass of humanity. I have argued that a technofeudal covenant

³ Próspera is a semi-autonomous charter city and special economic zone located on the island of Roatán, Honduras. It operates with a distinct legal, regulatory, and fiscal system designed to attract investment, entrepreneurship, and innovation. Its key investors include Marc Andreessen and Peter Thiel.

(see also Phipps 2026: 213) both camouflages and consolidates elite dominance amidst technologically-mediated over-accumulation and resultant depletion, helping tech billionaires to secure futurity for themselves at the expense of the empirical human world. Fleshing out the concept of brologarchy - through the bifurcated, technofeudal Man₃ - has illuminated both the emergent economic conjuncture and a violent reconfiguration of power, gender, and humanity.

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